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 Tax regulations are the highest form of policy guidance issued by the U.S. Treasury 
Department, in coordination with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to assist taxpayers with 
calculating their U.S. tax liability. Although Treasury Regulations increase tax certainty because 
they have the full force of law, it is unclear how investors will react to such guidance. On the one 
hand, tax regulations can reduce firms’ risk of future audits and penalties by clarifying 
interpretations and procedures of tax law. On the other hand, such guidance can increase 
compliance costs and close lucrative tax planning strategies. This study uses 140 hand-collected 
releases of Treasury Regulations from 1994 to 2015 in an event-study methodology to infer from 
public companies’ stock prices how investors value tax certainty through policy guidance. Three 
main results emerge. First, across the sample period, investors react to tax policy guidance upon 
its issuance, but the direction depends on the type of guidance. Second, negative investor 
valuation occurs in the pre-FIN 48 period (i.e., before 2007) before detailed public disclosures on 
tax uncertainties are made available in firms’ financial statements thus are less salient to 
investors, but reverses and becomes positively valued post-FIN 48 when tax uncertainties are 
more salient to investors. Third, within the post-FIN 48 period, investors value tax policy 
guidance more positively for firms with greater amounts of uncertain tax positions, as inferred 
from R&D activities and the FIN 48 tax reserve, compared to firms with smaller uncertain tax 
positions. Collectively, this paper finds that tax policy guidance is value-enhancing when public 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The extant literature examines investors’ reactions to new tax laws and new tax-related 
accounting standards. For example, researchers have focused on investors’ valuation of the initial 
enactment, or discussion of enactment, of tax laws and standards by relevant governing bodies 
such as the U.S. Congress or Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (e.g., Slemrod 
1986; Bolster et al. 1989; Ayers 1998; Lang and Shackelford 2000; Ayers et al. 2002; 
Frischmann et al. 2008; Khan et al. 2017). However, almost entirely overlooked in the literature 
is the regulatory process that occurs after the law or standard is enacted and during which the 
enacted rules are further clarified and developed. Specifically, there is little to no evidence on the 
value of subsequent regulatory actions surrounding tax policy guidance, despite that many of 
these actions have the full force of law and we observe a massive regulatory apparatus that 
supports tax administration (i.e., U.S. Treasury Department [Treasury] and the Internal Revenue 
Service [IRS]). This paper addresses the void in the literature by examining three research 
questions. First, do investors value tax policy guidance—issued after initial tax laws are 
enacted—that are specifically designed to reduce firms’ tax uncertainties? Second, does the 
valuation differ during periods when the salience of tax uncertainty to investors is weaker versus 
stronger, namely before versus after the promulgation of Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 
48) (FASB 2006) when reserves for tax uncertainties are publicly disclosed in firms’ financial 
statements? Third, is the valuation effect stronger in firms with larger tax uncertainties?  
From a policy perspective, Treasury and the IRS have many tools at their disposal to 
maximize taxpayer compliance. The most common perspective of Treasury and the IRS is that 
they are authorities that select taxpayers for audit and impose fines and penalties when non-
compliance is discovered (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Wilson 2009; Hoopes et al. 2012). 
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Importantly, this perspective in tax compliance takes an ex post focus, that is, tax authorities take 
enforcement actions that occur after a taxpayer files its tax return. A far less-studied perspective 
in tax compliance is how taxpayers can be guided and advised before they file their tax return on 
how to properly identify and fully report the correct amount of income and tax, especially when 
those amounts are uncertain (e.g., Beck and Lisowsky 2014). This taxpayer assistance 
perspective realizes that tax institutions can provide valuable guidance ex ante to taxpayers in 
order to avoid costly audits or litigation after the tax return is filed.  
The tax regulatory process, during which tax policy guidance such as Treasury 
Regulations and Interpretations are issued, is an important part of providing ex ante compliance 
advice to taxpayers. First, the objective of tax policy guidance is to provide clarification and 
greater certainty on important issues left open by previously enacted tax law, or harmonize 
inconsistencies or variation in applying various laws or other guidance. Second, many forms of 
tax policy guidance have the full force of law—i.e., they are binding on all taxpayers—because 
that power has been delegated to Treasury by the U.S. Congress. In effect, these are tax laws 
being enacted without the explicit consideration or consent of Congress, but that have the same 
impact as if they were passed by Congress directly. Third, because tax policy guidance is binding 
on all taxpayers, it can be considered as addressing a systematic, undiversifiable risk, which 
should be of interest to investors as they price securities. On the one hand, if tax policy guidance 
relieves tax uncertainty that reduces expected future compliance and audit costs, then this would 
reduce the discount rate and therefore investors should positively price the issuance of tax 
guidance. On the other hand, if tax policy guidance closes profitable tax planning strategies by 
eliminating inconsistencies in the tax law, then this would decrease tax cash outflows and 
therefore investors should negatively price the issuance of tax guidance. In all, it is unclear 
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which effect is stronger on net, and how investors will perceive this important function of U.S. 
tax regulators. 
In addition to the implementation of tax policy guidance, firms’ approach to tax reporting 
has also changed over time. Donohoe et al. (2014) describe that the function of corporate tax 
departments has evolved from being a profit center in the 1990s and early 2000s to, most 
recently, a risk management center that seeks to avoid tax controversies and adverse surprises to 
earnings. One catalyst for this evolution is the requirement by tax authorities and financial 
reporting standard setters for firms to disclose more information on their underlying tax 
positions. Specifically, additional information is required (1) privately by Treasury on firms’ 
book-tax differences beginning in 2004 on the Schedule M-3 (Donohoe and McGill 2011); (2) 
publicly by FASB on firms’ tax uncertainties beginning in 2007 due to FIN 48 (Frischmann et al. 
2008 and Lisowsky et al. 2013); and (3) privately by Treasury on firms’ tax uncertainties 
beginning in 2010 on the Schedule UTP (Edwards et al. 2010 and Towery 2017). The disclosures 
under FIN 48 and Schedule UTP likely created high saliency to stakeholders of firms’ tax 
uncertainties. This view is consistent with Blouin et al. (2010), who find that managers settled 
their open tax positions with the IRS in greater rates right before FIN 48 became effective, 
compared to periods when FIN 48 was not effective, in part to reduce the likelihood of future 
scrutiny by tax authorities and investors. This evolution away from profit-centered corporate tax 
reporting to risk management-centered tax reporting, and the associated increased saliency of tax 
uncertainty to investors, creates a strong setting in which to test investors’ differential reactions 
to tax policy guidance before and after uncertain tax positions were publicly disclosed in FIN 48.  
 Furthermore, the IRS has publicly reported since 2011 that firms’ tax uncertainties as 
reported on Schedule UTP broadly fall into five key categories: (1) research and development 
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(R&D) tax credit; (2) transfer pricing; (3) domestic production activities deduction; (4) 
capitalization; and (5) trade or business deductions. Additional scrutiny by the IRS on firms with 
these specific characteristics after the Schedule UTP became a required filing could make 
investors more sensitive to tax policy guidance in these areas.  
 To answer whether and the degree to which investors react positively or negatively to 
guidance from Treasury in its attempt to clarify complex tax issues, I hand-collect Treasury 
Regulations and their release dates from 1994 to 2015. I examine Treasury Regulations because 
once finalized they have the full force of law, they are usually the first and largest reveal of 
guidance on emerging tax issues, and they are likely to get the attention of investors and the 
media. For example, on June 2, 2014, Forbes published an article summarizing the key 
provisions of final regulations TD 9666, which were published earlier that morning (Forbes 
2014): 
 “Today – Treasury announced regulations (TD 9666) that will allow companies 
to take the Research and Development Alternative Simplified Credit (ASC) on 
amended returns... the previous regulations allowed companies to take the ASC 
only on original returns.  This limitation allowing ASC only on original returns is 
in stark contrast to the regular R&D tax credit (and just about every other tax 
provision) – which the law and regulations allow you to take for all open years 
(usually the previous three tax years).”  
 
 To limit data collection costs, I focus on the five primary areas of uncertainty reported on 
Schedule UTP as identified by the IRS to provide adequate power for my tests. I identify 140 tax 
guidance events in total, issued as Treasury Regulations, Requests for Comments (RFCs), and 
Notices. I regress cumulative portfolio abnormal returns (CAR) on each of the three-day 
windows surrounding the tax regulatory release date to estimate investors’ reaction to tax policy 
guidance (see Schipper and Thompson 1983; Sefcik and Thompson 1986; Frischmann et al. 
2008; and Donohoe and McGill 2011). I perform these tests (1) pooled over my sample period; 
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(2) comparing pre-FIN 48 vs. post-FIN 48 periods; and (3) within only the FIN 48 period and 
across firms that have greater R&D activities and FIN 48 tax reserves. I also investigate 
investors’ reaction to individual issues (e.g., R&D tax credits or transfer pricing), and whether 
tax guidance is generally anticipatory or specifically expresses a formal position of Treasury. 
Results show that the issuance of tax policy guidance elicits a different valuation from 
investors in the pooled sample across all years, depending on which tax issue is being addressed. 
For example, tax policy guidance on R&D tax credits generates a positive investor response, 
while guidance on capitalization generates a negative investor response, on average. However, 
results for all tax issues show a significantly negative investor response during the pre-FIN 48 
period when only tax cash flows are quantifiable to investors compared to a significantly positive 
investor response during the post-FIN 48 period when tax uncertainty becomes quantifiable and 
therefore more salient. These results are consistent with tax policy guidance serving a value- 
enhancing (-destroying) role during a period when investors are more (less) aware of firms’ tax 
uncertainties. Also consistent with this inference, further evidence shows that within the FIN 48 
period, investors respond more positively to tax policy guidance in firms with relatively higher 
R&D activities and FIN 48 reserves for uncertain tax benefits. That is, tax policy guidance seems 
to work strongly—and positively—where uncertainty appears to be the highest. Finally, I find 
that both anticipated and actual guidance provided by Treasury is positively priced by investors 
in the post-FIN 48 era and for firms with greater exposure to tax uncertainty. 
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it establishes that investors 
price tax events beyond simply initial tax legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress or initial tax-
related financial reporting rules promulgated by FASB (e.g., Slemrod 1986; Bolster et al. 1989; 
Ayers 1998; Lang and Shackelford 2000; Ayers et al. 2002; Frischmann et al. 2008). In doing so, 
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this study identifies the tax regulatory process as an important, ongoing, value-enhancing 
function that is consistent with the reduction of risk associated with tax uncertainty. Second, this 
study highlights the valuable role of institutions to advise taxpayers ex ante, or before they file 
their tax returns, to reduce expected tax compliance and audit costs (Beck and Lisowsky 2014). 
This perspective stands in contrast to the commonly perceived function of Treasury and the IRS 
as simply enforcing tax laws ex post, or after firms file their tax returns, to increase compliance 
(Hoopes et al. 2012). Third, this study identifies a unique setting in which to test the market 
valuation of tax uncertainty. Prior research finds a positive valuation of FIN 48 tax reserves 
(Koester 2011), which is theoretically inconsistent with tax reserves representing a true liability, 
and one that cannot be diversified. By focusing on the tax regulatory process as a series of 
exogenous events, this study re-examines the pricing effect of tax uncertainty and finds that a 
reduction in tax uncertainty is generally value-enhancing. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the regulatory process. Section III 
provides a literature review. Section IV develops the hypotheses and Section V reports the 
results. Section VI concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2: REGULATORY PROCESS  
Overview 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is the agency within the U.S. Treasury Department 
tasked with the collection of tax revenues and the administration of the IRC. Treasury broadly 
employs two methods towards increasing tax compliance: ex post enforcement and ex ante 
guidance. Under the more familiar ex post perspective, Treasury takes enforcement actions by 
commissioning the IRS to audit tax returns after they are filed and assess additional taxes, fines, 
or penalties if necessary. These actions typically garner much media attention, such as the IRS’s 
fight against individual tax evasion (e.g., Leona Helmsley and Wesley Snipes) or corporate tax 
sheltering (e.g., KPMG’s $456 million settlement for promoting tax shelters; see Wilson 2009, 
Lisowsky 2010, and Brown 2011). Less familiar, but likely just as important, is the ex ante 
perspective, which ensures that taxpayers identify, report, and pay the correct and full amount of 
tax liability before filing their tax returns with the IRS. Examples of this perspective include 
withholdings and third-party information reporting (e.g., Form W-2 for wages and Form 1099 for 
interest income). Other tools to ensure ex ante compliance include advanced pricing agreements 
(APAs) and the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) program (see Beck and Lisowsky 2014). 
One often-overlooked ex ante approach Treasury pursues is the issuance of policy 
guidance on corporate tax issues. Treasury, in coordination with the IRS and Office of Chief 
Counsel, issues guidance in multiple official forms including, but not limited to, Tax 
Regulations, Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures, Private Letter Rulings (PLR), Technical 
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Advice Memoranda (TAM), Notices, and Announcements. These types of guidance are 
specifically used by Treasury to “fill in the blanks” of incomplete tax law.1  
Avenues for Guidance  
In accordance with the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, tax regulations are 
published in the Federal Register to keep the public informed of the rule-making process. Tax 
regulations fall into two broad categories. First, Legislative Regulations address situations in 
which “…Congress simply provided an end result, without any guidance as to how to achieve the 
desired goal or when a statutory provision does not provide adequate authority for the regulatory 
action taken.”2 Legislative Regulations can only be overturned by the courts if they are found in 
violation of the more stringent Chevron standard,3 which occurs only if the regulation is 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Second, Interpretive Regulations 
address situations in which “Congress provided specific rules and merely left gaps for the 
Secretary [of the Treasury] to fill…” after the law was passed.4 Prior to 2011, Interpretive 
Regulations could only be overturned by the courts if they were found in violation of the less 
stringent National Muffler standard,5 which requires each regulation to “harmonize with the plain 
language of the statute, its origin, and purpose.” However, in 2011 the Supreme Court ruled in 
Mayo Foundation vs. U.S., that both Legislative and Interpretive Regulations are now subject to 
the Chevron standard.6 Regulations that meet either the Chevron or National Muffler standard are 
applicable, binding, and have the force of law on all taxpayers. Because both Legislative and 
                                                          
1 Another important source of tax law relates to court cases. Although the judicial source of tax law technically 
applies to all taxpayers and also clarifies the tax law and other tax guidance, the particular facts and circumstances 
of each case may result in different court rulings for taxpayers with different facts and circumstances.  
2 Internal Revenue Manual 32.1.1.2.7 (https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32) 
3 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
4 Internal Revenue Manual 32.1.1.2.8 (https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32) 
5 National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979) 
6 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research et al. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011) 
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Interpretive Regulations reveal Treasury’s interpretation and position regarding the IRC, I refer 
to both of these key types of regulatory guidance throughout the paper as Treasury Regulations. 
Other important forms of regulatory guidance are known as Revenue Rulings and 
Revenue Procedures, which are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Revenue Rulings 
provide Treasury’s official interpretation of the IRC and often include examples of how the law 
is applied to a specific set of facts. Revenue Procedures provide the proper procedure for making 
certain elections or allocations.  
In contrast, specific taxpayers with unique circumstances not clearly defined in 
Regulations, Rulings, or Procedures can send a written request for a PLR in order to obtain 
Treasury’s interpretation and application of tax law, specific to the facts and circumstances 
described by the taxpayer, before the taxpayer files a tax return. In contrast, a TAM is guidance 
obtained after a tax return is filed, and is requested from the IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel in 
order to obtain Treasury’s final position regarding a specific transaction that already took place. 
Both PLRs and TAMs are made public after the taxpayer’s identifying information has been 
removed, and the force of law is applicable to that particular taxpayer only. Of course, other 
taxpayers can use this information when evaluating their own tax positions, but PLRs and TAMs 
are only suggestive of Treasury’s interpretations and do not have the force of law on all 
taxpayers. 
Last, Treasury publishes Notices or Announcements to convey guidance to taxpayers. 
Some Notices are used to officially request public comments on specific tax issues or to schedule 
hearings while others provide substantive interpretations of the IRC. Announcements typically 
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do not provide any substantive interpretation. For example, they can include reminders of 
pending dates of importance.7 
Tax Regulation Process  
As mentioned above, Treasury Regulations reveal Treasury’s interpretation and position 
regarding the IRC. Regulations are officially released in Proposed, Temporary, or Final formats. 
Treasury must follow the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 in keeping the public not only 
informed, but also involved in seeking feedback during the regulatory process. To accomplish 
this goal, Treasury follows a structured process. The regulatory process is detailed below; also 
see Figure 1.  
Request for Comments 
A request for comments (RFC), without simultaneously issuing any official regulation, 
usually occurs at the earliest stage in the regulatory process and is used as an information 
gathering tool to help Treasury develop regulations that are suitable before releasing their official 
position on the issues. A RFC often occurs when Treasury anticipates or recognizes the need to 
provide additional guidance on certain IRC sections or existing regulations, often after realizing 
that those IRC sections and/or regulations are in conflict with one another, they are being 
inconsistently applied, or taxpayers exploit discrepancies between them. These RFCs typically 
inform the public of the request and very briefly describe the topic, but otherwise do not reveal 
any specific intent to legislate or what position Treasury will claim regarding the issue (if any). 
For example, on May 6, 2013, Treasury issued Notice 2013-10578, as reported in the Federal 
Register:  
“The Department of the Treasury… invites the general public and other Federal 
agencies to take this opportunity to comment on proposed and/or continuing 
information collections... Currently, the IRS is soliciting comments concerning, 
                                                          
7 Internal Revenue Manual 32.2.2.3.3 (https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32) 
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Final Election of Reduced Research Credit. … This regulation relates to the 
manner of making an election under section 280C(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Taxpayers making this election must reduce their section 41(a) research 
credit, but are not required to reduce their deductions for qualified research 
expenses, as required in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 280C(c).”  
 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) are always accompanied by a 
request for comment (RFC), but usually have a much richer description and detail of the issue 
that Treasury is concerned about. Additionally, ANPRMs sometimes provide the tax authority’s 
initial position on an issue by describing what and how it intends to regulate the issue. The public 
is requested to comment on the suitability of their regulatory approach, whether or not the public 
agrees with the need for regulation in the area, and any potential issues or unintended conflicts 
that the agency may have left unaddressed. As a result, ANPRMs are often used as a way for 
Treasury to reveal its position early on, but with flexibility to change it later.  
Proposed Regulations and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
Before a regulation can become finalized, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 
requires agencies to notify the public of the regulation beforehand, issue a request for comments, 
and, if there is enough interest, hold hearings during which taxpayers voice their opinion 
regarding the issue. To comply with this law, Treasury issues Proposed Regulations and gives a 
Notice of the Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register. If Treasury anticipates 
significant public comment and requests for hearings, then at the time of issuance it will schedule 
a hearing approximately 60 days from the date of issuance. Surprising to some, proposed 
regulations have no authoritative legal power and cannot be relied upon by either IRS auditors or 
taxpayers, except to the extent that there are no other regulations governing the area. Proposed 
regulations reveal the exact interpretation and legislative intent of Treasury. Proposed regulations 
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can be withdrawn at any time, but must be active at least 30 days immediately before a Final 
regulation can be issued.8 
Temporary Regulations 
If Treasury wishes to address an urgent issue with immediate guidance that has the full 
force of law, then it can issue Temporary Regulations. However, as the name implies, these 
regulations are not permanent and expire in three years from the date of enactment unless further 
regulatory action is taken. Because the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 requires all 
rulemaking to be issued in proposed format, all Temporary Regulations are simultaneously 
issued with a Proposed Regulation. While most Temporary Regulations are re-issued as Final 
Regulations after the Proposed Regulation’s comment period, there are instances when they are 
not, so they simply expire after the three-year period. When Temporary Regulations are issued, 
both the Temporary Regulation and the Proposed Regulation are filed with identical language as 
two separate documents with the Federal Register. 
Final Regulations 
After evaluating written comments or holding hearings from the public (if requested) 
regarding a Proposed Regulation for at least 30 days from the date the Proposed Regulation is 
published, the agencies decide if, how, and when to issue them with the force of law. If no 
comments are received, comments are deemed too trivial to require adjustments to the 
rulemaking, or Treasury disagrees with issues raised in the comments, then the agency will 
usually issue Final Regulations worded very similarly, if not identically, to the Proposed 
Regulation, and thus have the force of law. However, if comments from the public substantively 
impact the language of the regulations, then the agencies can either withdraw the Proposed 
                                                          
8 For my sample, the mean (median) time between each finalized regulation and its most recent proposed regulation 
is 656 (581) days.  
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Regulation, leave it in place while gathering more information on the issue or waiting for 
Congress or the judicial system to weigh in on the matter, update the regulatory language and 
issue it in proposed format again, or issue Final Regulations with the language as is but 
simultaneously issue Temporary Regulations that do contain updated language. This last strategy 
effectively allows Treasury to make a last-minute change to the Final Regulation with the full 
force of law for up to three years via the simultaneously issued Temporary Regulation. 
Collectively, regulations are the most authoritative and prominent form of tax guidance, 
they have the force of law, and unlike guidance designed for only some specific taxpayers (e.g., 
PLRs), tax policy guidance is binding on all taxpayers. 
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CHAPTER 3: RELATED LITERATURE  
 
Prior research has examined investors’ reactions to new tax laws enacted by Congress or 
similar governing body in foreign countries. For example, Bolster et al. (1989) find that an 
increase in the long-term capital gains tax rate following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 induced 
investors to sell gain stocks in December 1986 before the tax hike went into effect in 1987. On 
the other hand, Grammatikos and Yourogou (1990) show that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
elicited little to no market reaction from investors in banking stocks. Guenther and Willenborg 
(1999) find the lowering of small business capital gain taxes in 1993 had a positive effect on 
investors’ IPO pricing. Lang and Shackelford (2000) establish that investors priced changes in 
capital gains tax rates during the week in May 1997 that Congress and the White House agreed 
on capital gain tax cuts. Edwards et al. (2004) show that German firms with high cross-holdings 
experience a positive abnormal return after the lock-in effect of its corporate capital gains tax is 
removed. Edwards and Shevlin (2011) find a negative market valuation after a Canadian entity-
level tax is introduced onto flow-through entities. The overarching takeaway from these and 
other studies is that the market in general reacts negatively (positively) to new tax laws that are 
anticipated to directly increase (decrease) the tax burden. 
Prior research has also examined investors’ reactions to the initial disclosure release dates 
of FASB deliberations and pronouncements. For example, Espahbodi et al. (1995) show a 
positive abnormal return on the exposure draft dates of the income increasing accounting 
standards laid out in SFAS 96 and SFAS 109, while Ayers (1998) finds an increase in value-
relevance for deferred tax accounting following the promulgation of SFAS 109. Frischmann et 
al. (2008) find that the market was not very concerned with the FASB’s deliberations over 
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additional disclosures under what became FIN 48, although the market reaction turned negative 
as the U.S. Senate opened an inquiry on the largest firms’ uncertain tax positions.  
Two recent papers examine when a taxing agency exercises its authority to increase tax 
enforcement via the issuance of new (and perhaps more invasive) tax disclosures. Donohoe and 
McGill (2011) find negative market reactions surrounding important dates regarding Schedule 
M-3, which substantially increased the amount of information firms are required to report to the 
IRS regarding their book-tax differences. Abernathy et al. (2013) show similar negative market 
reactions surrounding key dates during Treasury’s deliberations over the Schedule UTP, which 
requires taxpayers to explicitly disclose their federal uncertain tax positions on their U.S. tax 
return. Both the Schedule M-3 and Schedule UTP are designed to reduce opportunities for 
taxpayers to take aggressive positions, including curtailing tax evasion, but it comes with the cost 
of burdening less aggressive taxpayers with providing additional disclosures. 
Almost entirely overlooked by these studies is that the IRS is much more than just an ex 
post tax enforcement body searching for tax evaders through audits and invasive reporting 
requirements. The IRS is also very active ex ante provider of tax guidance who diligently works 
to assist taxpayers in complying with the IRC. To accomplish this goal, the IRS has over 90,000 
employees, the majority of whom are non-enforcement related (~60%),9 with approximately 500 
tax offices in local communities throughout the country,10 an information-centric website, a toll-
free call center, and a volunteer income tax assistance (VITA) program for taxpayers who cannot 
afford to seek private tax advice. As described in Section II, there are many avenues for tax 
authorities to provide guidance to taxpayers before they file their tax returns, including Treasury 
Regulations, Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures, Notices, and Announcements. These are all 




resources that have the primary objective of assisting taxpayers to understand and comply with 
the IRC, and thus avoid costly audits after tax returns are filed.  
However, taxpayers may be genuinely uncertain on how to identify and properly report 
all their tax positions. This is an important concern to tax authorities because prior literature has 
shown tax uncertainty to be costly. Brown et al. (2017) find the period of tax policy uncertainty 
to be correlated with stock return volatility, which leads to an increase in analyst dispersion and 
thus imposes a real cost to investors. To help curb some uncertainty, in 2005 the IRS set up its 
innovative Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) audit program to specifically reduce and 
eliminate tax uncertainty before the tax return is filed. The CAP audit program is a voluntary 
program where taxpayers agree to reveal all uncertain tax positions to the IRS, and in doing so 
agree to a real-time audit where tax issues are typically resolved before year-end. Beck and 
Lisowsky (2014) find that firms who voluntarily participated in the CAP audit program reduced 
their FIN 48 tax reserves by 16.5 percent compared to non-CAP firms. This result is consistent 
with taxpayers benefiting from ex ante guidance. However, a disadvantage of the CAP setting 
from a research perspective is that it is taxpayer-specific, and only about 100 corporations 
participate in the program. Also, investors have little information about firms’ participation in 
CAP, so it is difficult to assess whether they find this activity value-increasing or decreasing. 
Where prior literature has examined investors’ reactions to the discussion and passage of 
tax laws, or to the ex post reporting and enforcement side of Treasury and the IRS, this study is 
one of the first to take a holistic approach at examining the ex ante compliance function of 
Treasury and the IRS. Importantly, I examine investors’ valuation of ex ante compliance 
activities pertaining to tax guidance issued by Treasury. 
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CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
Treasury attempts to anticipate and address wide-ranging tax issues by providing ex ante 
guidance to taxpayers on how to report their tax positions. Proposed, Temporary, and Final 
Regulations provide important guidance to taxpayers and can provide new information to 
markets. On the one hand, if guidance issued through tax regulations helps to clarify tax law by 
revealing Treasury’s interpretations and positions, then this clarification should reduce the 
uncertainty of taxpayers’ past and future tax positions, and thus reduce future audit and 
compliance costs. This reduced uncertainty would decrease the discount rate and therefore, one 
would expect a positive market reaction to the issuance of tax policy guidance.  
On the other hand, it is possible that investors will react negatively to tax regulations. 
First, tax regulations may not materially reduce taxpayer uncertainty, especially to the extent 
they are perceived to contradict Congressional intent, the IRC, and other regulations. Second, 
they may add complexity and additional compliance costs. Such an effect is evidenced by 
President Trump’s Executive Order 2017-04-21 to review all tax regulations from 2016 forward 
to ensure they do not (1) impose an undue financial burden on U.S. taxpayers; (2) add undue 
complexity to the federal tax laws; or (3) exceed the statutory authority of the Internal Revenue 
Service. Third, to the extent regulations close loopholes or inconsistencies in tax law, then 
regulations may cause an increase in tax payments.  
Collectively, guidance may decrease uncertainty to taxpayers, which should be beneficial 
to equity prices. However, guidance may also increase tax burdens, complexity, and compliance 
costs. It is also possible that no effect can be detected, either because the positive and negative 
effects cancel each other out or because investors simply do not price tax guidance events. 
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Because investors’ reaction to tax guidance is not clear ex ante, I state my first hypothesis in null 
form: 
H1: Stock market valuation will not be associated with tax policy guidance. 
Effective for fiscal years ending in 2007 and later, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) issued Financial Interpretation Number 48 (FIN 48) (FASB 2006). In short, FIN 
48 requires firms to examine each tax position based solely upon its technical merits with the 
assumption that the IRS has full knowledge of all pertinent information related to the issue. If it 
is “more likely than not” that the issue would not be sustained upon IRS scrutiny at the highest 
court, then a reserve for unrecognized tax benefits (UTB) is accrued to reflect uncertain tax 
positions while the statute of limitations is open on the position (ASC 740).  
FIN 48 also requires additional disclosures in firms’ financial statements regarding their 
uncertain tax positions. Examples of these disclosures include a tabular rollforward schedule, 
which includes the beginning and ending balances of the UTB, as well as changes to the UTB 
due to current and prior year positions, as well as tax settlements. After the implementation of 
FIN 48, taxes became much more prominent in the financial statements because both investors 
and the IRS could now explicitly assess firms’ uncertain tax positions and price them 
accordingly (see Frischmann et al. 2008, Robinson and Schmidt 2013; and Bozanic et al. 2017). 
While FIN 48 only directly affected the accrual and disclosure of uncertain tax benefits, Blouin 
et al. (2010) find evidence that FIN 48 moved managers to settle their uncertain tax positions 
with the IRS before the public disclosure requirement went into effect, while Gupta et al. (2014) 
find evidence that FIN 48 caused more cash taxes to be paid to taxing authorities.  
Additionally, prior accounting research has demonstrated that more saliently displayed 
financial information is weighed more heavily in the judgment and decision-making process 
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(Elliott et al. 2015). For example, analysts (Hirst and Hopkins 1998) and nonprofessional 
investors (Maines and McDaniel 2000) both weight other comprehensive income more heavily 
when it is disclosed prominently on the face of the financial statement than if it is reported in the 
statement of changes in shareholders’ equity. To the extent investors after FIN 48 are more 
aware of and concerned about firms’ tax uncertainty overall due to this information now being 
more prominent displayed on the financial statements, then they may place more weight on the 
discount rate effect when valuing Treasury guidance after FIN 48 than before FIN 48. However, 
prior to 2007, Donohoe et al. (2014) find that corporate tax departments operated like profit 
centers who focused and placed a high priority on reducing tax expense by concentrating on tax 
planning strategies that could lower effective tax rates. Tax departments during this era had a 
cost minimization focus in an effort “to enhance shareholder value” (Robinson et al. 2010). To 
the extent investors during this time also place heavy emphasis and focus on reduced tax cash 
outflows, then this may lead them to place more weight on the cash flow effect when valuing 
Treasury guidance before FIN 48 than after FIN 48.  
However, guidance could also backfire and create more uncertainty if it increases the 
complexity of compliance or contradicts prior tax law, especially post-FIN 48 when this 
information is more salient to investors. Additionally, guidance could reduce tax cash outflows 
to the extent guidance creates additional “grey areas” in the tax law, especially pre-FIN 48 when 
heavy emphasis on reduced effective tax rates is high. As such, my second hypothesis is stated in 
null form: 
H2: The valuation of tax policy guidance is not different pre- versus post-FIN 48. 
As mentioned above, FIN 48 standardized the accounting and disclosure for 
unrecognized tax benefits in the financial statements. In general, the UTB indicates how 
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uncertain a firm is based on its tax positions reported on its tax return. Uncertain tax positions 
accrued in the UTB can arise from aggressive tax strategies in grey areas or by taking a benign 
position in a genuinely uncertain tax law (Beck and Jung 1989a and 1989b; Beck et al. 2000; 
Mills et al. 2010; Lisowsky et al. 2013; Beck and Lisowsky 2014). In 2010, Treasury began 
requiring firms with assets of $10 million or more to explicitly list each of their (U.S.-based) 
uncertain tax positions on the new Schedule UTP. After viewing the Schedules UTP in the first 
year, Treasury reported that the most common uncertain tax issue was related to the Research 
and Development (R&D) Tax Credit (§41 of the IRC). 
In the post FIN 48 era, when uncertain tax positions are more salient to investors due to 
the mandatory accrual and disclosure of UTBs, then firms with larger levels of uncertain tax 
positions should gain the most from receiving guidance to reduce their tax uncertainty, assuming 
guidance is value-increasing. However, if tax guidance reduces opportunities for lucrative tax 
planning, then guidance will be more value-decreasing the larger the uncertain tax positions. The 
following summarizes my third hypotheses (in null form):  
H3: The valuation of tax policy guidance does not vary according to firms’ level of tax  




CHAPTER 5: METHOD  
 
Empirical Models 
Test of H1: Investor Valuation of Tax Guidance  
This study uses the Multivariate Regression Method (MVRM) initially described by 
Gibbons (1980), later adapted by Schipper and Thompson (1983) generally and Frischmann et al. 
(2008) and Donohoe and McGill (2011) specifically in a tax setting, to study the change in 
market valuation of the tax regulation events identified in my sample. The MVRM model 
conditions the return-generating process on the occurrence (non-occurrence) of an event date by 
coding a dummy variable with the value 1 (0) on the three-day window surrounding the event 
date (t = –1, 0, +1). The three-day window is used since the exact timing of the release may not 
be known (e.g., there may be advance information leaking to the market). Additionally, I include 
the Fama and French (2015) five-factor asset pricing model variables to control for common risk 
factors. I estimate the change in stock market valuation of firms around the regulatory event 
dates using the following model (see Appendix for all variable definitions): 




+ 𝜖𝑝𝑡                                                                                                          
I define 𝑅𝑝𝑡 as the portfolio 𝑝 return which is calculated as an equally weighted mean 
return less the risk-free rate on day t (t = –1, 0, +1), where t is the total number of daily return 
observations from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 2015 (in my case, T = 5,540).11 The 
                                                          
11Portfolio p is formed by taking the equally weighted return, less the risk-free rate, of all firms meeting the sample 
selection criteria on day t. There are 5,540 trading days between 1994 and 2015 (~252 trading days per year for 22 
years) and one portfolio p is formed on each day, such that there are 5,540 portfolios formed. 
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variable 𝛼𝑝 is the intercept coefficient of portfolio p;  𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the market risk-adjusted 
return on date t; 𝛽1𝑝 is the risk coefficient for portfolio p. Next, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the return on a portfolio 
of small stocks less the return on a portfolio of big stocks; 𝛽2𝑝 is the coefficient for the small 
minus big portfolio. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market value stocks less 
the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market value stocks; 𝛽3𝑝 is the coefficient for the high 
minus low portfolio. 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the return on a portfolio of robust operating profitability stocks 
less the return on a portfolio of weak operating profitability stocks; 𝛽4𝑝 is the coefficient for the 
robust minus weak portfolio. 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is the return on a portfolio of conservative investment stocks 
less the return on a portfolio of aggressive investment stocks; 𝛽5𝑝 is the coefficient for the 
conservative minus aggressive portfolio.  
Turning to the regulatory events in the regression, the coefficient of interest 𝑔1𝑝𝑘 reflects 
the effect of regulation k (k = 1, 2, …, K) on portfolio p’s return, such that 𝑔1 is an estimate of 
the abnormal return on the portfolio on event date k; K is the total number of regulations 
examined (in my case, K = 140). GUIDEkt is an indicator variable for the kth event and equals 1 
during the three-day period (t = –1, 0, +1) around the regulation release date, 0 otherwise. In 
testing H1, 𝑔𝑝𝑘>0 (𝑔𝑝𝑘<0) is consistent with investors believing that the reduction of tax 
uncertainty due to new tax regulations is value increasing (value decreasing), on average. 
Finally, 𝜖𝑝𝑡 is a random disturbance term assumed to be both normal and independent of 
the explanatory variables. The unit of analysis is portfolio returns. Because returns are assumed 
to be serially independent, there is minimal concern regarding either time-series dependence or 
cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. However, to correct for possible time-series 
heteroscedasticity, I use a procedure developed by White (1980) that allows the variance-
covariance matrix of the residuals to vary across observations. 
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Test of H2: Valuation of Tax Guidance Before and After FIN 48 
To test whether investors value Treasury guidance from tax regulations differently after 
FIN 48 compared to before FIN 48, I re-estimate Eq. (1) after splitting the tax regulations into 
those that occurred before and after January 1, 2007, as follows: 







+ 𝜖𝑝𝑡                                       
All variables and their definitions are the same as Eq. (1), except for GUIDEkt, which is split 
into PreGUIDEkt and PostGUIDEkt, and 𝑔1𝑝𝑘, which is split into 𝑔2𝑝𝑘 and 𝑔3𝑝𝑘. PreGUIDEkt 
and PostGUIDEkt are indicator variables for the kth event and equal to 1 during the three-day 
period (t = –1, 0, +1) around the regulatory event date; K* is set to the last event occurring before 
January 1, 2007 (in my case, K* = 80). The coefficient 𝑔2𝑝𝑘 captures the abnormal return before 
FIN 48 became effective, and 𝑔3𝑝𝑘 captures the abnormal return after FIN 48 became effective. 
In testing H2, 𝑔3𝑝𝑘>0 (𝑔3𝑝𝑘<0) is consistent with investors believing that the reduction of tax 
uncertainty due to new tax regulations is value increasing (value decreasing) after FIN 48. 
To better understand whether investors’ valuation of guidance in Eq. (2) is due to the 
actual receipt of guidance or the anticipation of receiving guidance, I further split the regulations 
into those where Treasury does versus does not reveal its official position on a tax issue. Of my 
140 event dates, 61 (44%) are RFCs and ANPRMs, which contain little or no information 
regarding Treasury’s actual position on a tax issue. Rather, they reveal that Treasury is 
considering whether or not to take an official position. I refer to this type of guidance as 
“Anticipated Guidance.” The remaining 79 events (56%) are comprised of Proposed 
Regulations, Temporary Regulations, and Final Regulations, each of which communicate 
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Treasury’s official position. I refer to this group of guidance events as “Actual Guidance.” I 
decompose Eq. (2) as follows: 














+ 𝜖𝑝𝑡     
All variables and their definitions remain unchanged from Eq. (2), except for 
PreGUIDEkt, which is split into PreAnticipatedGUIDElt and PreActualGUIDEmt; PostGUIDEkt, 
which is split into PostAnticipatedGUIDElt and PostActualGUIDEmt; 𝑔2𝑝𝑘, which is split into 
𝑔4𝑝𝑙 and 𝑔6𝑝𝑚; 𝑔3𝑝𝑘, which is split into 𝑔5𝑝𝑙 and 𝑔7𝑝𝑚; and K which is split into L and M. L is 
the total number of Anticipated Guidance examined (in my case L = 61); M is the total number of 
Actual Guidance examined (in my case M = 79); PreAnticipatedGUIDElt and 
PostAnticipatedGUIDElt (PreActualGUIDEmt and PostActualGUIDEmt) are indicator variables 
for the lth (mth) event and equal to 1 during the three-day period (t = –1, 0, +1) around the event 
date; L* (M*) is set to the last event occurring before January 1, 2007 (in my case L* = 46 (M* = 
33)), so that 𝑔4𝑝𝑙 (𝑔6𝑝𝑚) now captures the abnormal return for Anticipated (Actual) Guidance 
before FIN 48 became effective and 𝑔5𝑝𝑙 (𝑔7𝑝𝑚) now captures the abnormal return for 
Anticipated (Actual) Guidance after FIN 48 went into effect. 
To alleviate concerns that changes in investors’ pre- versus post-FIN 48 valuation of 
guidance in Eqs. (2) and (3) are caused by changes in the favorability of guidance news (e.g., 
from negative to positive), I further split the regulations into the likely cash flow impact on most 
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taxpayers. Due to the need for expertise in coding cash flow news, I limit this analysis to the 
largest uncertain tax position regulation, §41 R&D Tax Credit, which makes up 39% of my 
sample or 54 event dates. Anticipated Guidance (i.e., RFCs and ANPRMs) contain little or no 
information regarding Treasury’s actual position and so they are not coded. This leaves 23 
Actual Guidance event dates, of which 9 (39%) contain negative cash flow news, 5 (22%) 
contain neutral cash flow news, and 9 (39%) contain positive cash flow news. News was coded 
by myself through the examination of both the preamble to each regulation as well as summaries 
produced by the Big4 which detail how the regulation would potentially impact its clients. I have 
future plans to use a Big4 Director/Partner to independently code not only the §41 R&D Tax 
Credit Regulations, but also the §482 Transfer Pricing Regulations which would increase 
coverage from 39% to 65% of my sample. I decompose actual guidance events from Eq. (3) as 
follows: 




























+ 𝜖𝑝𝑡     
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All variables and their definitions remain unchanged from Eq. (3), except for 
PreActualGUIDEmt, which is split into PreNegativeGUIDEqt, PreNeutralGUIDErt and 
PrePositiveGUIDEst; PostActualGUIDEmt, which is split into PostNegativeGUIDEqt, 
PostNeutralGUIDErt and PostPositiveGUIDEst; 𝑔6𝑝𝑚, which is split into 𝑔8𝑝𝑞, 𝑔10𝑝𝑟 and 𝑔12𝑝𝑠; 
𝑔7𝑝𝑚, which is split into 𝑔9𝑝𝑞 , 𝑔11𝑝𝑟 and 𝑔13𝑝𝑠; and M which is split into Q, R and S. Q is the 
total number of Negative Guidance examined (in my case Q = 9); R is the total number of 
Neutral Guidance examined (in my case R = 5); S is the total number of Positive Guidance 
examined (in my case S = 9); PreNegativeGUIDEat and PostNegativeGUIDEat 
(PreNeutralGUIDErt and PostNeutralGUIDErt) [PrePositiveGUIDEst and PostPositiveGUIDEst] 
are indicator variables for the qth (rth) [sth] event and equal to 1 during the three-day period (t = –
1, 0, +1) around the event date; Q* (R*) [S*] is set to the last event occurring before January 1, 
2007, so that 𝑔8𝑝𝑞 (𝑔10𝑝𝑟) [𝑔12𝑝𝑠] now captures the abnormal return for Negative (Neutral) 
[Positive] Guidance before FIN 48 became effective and 𝑔9𝑝𝑞 (𝑔11𝑝𝑟) [𝑔13𝑝𝑠] now captures the 
abnormal return for Negative (Neutral) [Positive] Guidance after FIN 48 went into effect. 
To better understand whether investors’ valuation of actual guidance in Eq. (3) is stronger 
when the guidance is required to be followed, I further split the Actual Guidance into regulations 
which have versus do not have the force of law. Of my 79 Actual Guidance event dates, 28 
(35%) are Proposed Regulations, which reveal Treasury’s position but do not have the force of 
law and cannot be relied upon by either a taxpayer or IRS agent under audit. I refer to this type 
of guidance as “Without Force Guidance.” The remaining 51 Actual Guidance events (65%) are 
comprised of Temporary and Final Regulations, each of which reveals Treasury’s final official 
position and carries with it the full force of law. I refer to this group of guidance events as “With 
Force Guidance.” I decompose the actual guidance variables from Eq. (3) as follows: 
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All variables and their definitions remain unchanged from Eq. (3), except for 
PreActualGUIDEmt, which is split into PreWithoutForceGUIDEut and PreWithForceGUIDEvt; 
PostActualGUIDEmt, which is split into PostWithoutGUIDEut and PostWithForceGUIDEvt; 
𝑔6𝑝𝑚, which is split into 𝑔14𝑝𝑢 and 𝑔16𝑝𝑣; 𝑔7𝑝𝑚, which is split into 𝑔15𝑝𝑢 and 𝑔17𝑝𝑣; and M 
which is split into U and V. U is the total number of Without Force Guidance examined (in my 
case U = 28); V is the total number of With Force Guidance examined (in my case V = 51); 
PreWithoutForceGUIDEut and PostWithoutForceGUIDEut (PreWithForceGUIDEvt and 
PostWithForceGUIDEvt) are indicator variables for the u
th (vth) event and equal to 1 during the 
three-day period (t = –1, 0, +1) around the event date; U* (V*) is set to the last event occurring 
before January 1, 2007, so that 𝑔14𝑝𝑢 (𝑔16𝑝𝑣) now captures the abnormal return for Actual 
Guidance without (with) the force of law before FIN 48 became effective and 𝑔15𝑝𝑢 (𝑔17𝑝𝑣) now 
captures the abnormal return for Actual Guidance without (with) the force of law after FIN 48 
went into effect. 
Test of H3: Cross-Sectional Variation in the Valuation of Tax Guidance  
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Finally, to examine whether the valuation of tax guidance varies as a function of firms’ 
tax uncertainty, I use a portfolio-weighting procedure developed by Sefcik and Thompson (1986) 
and subsequently used in other tax settings that test the investor reaction to regulatory events 
(Frischmann et al. 2008 and Donohoe and McGill 2011). This method is beneficial because it 
explicitly accounts for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and cross-correlation of residuals when 
the research design includes common event dates for all sample firms (i.e., release of guidance 
from Treasury). Using this approach, I include information relating to the full covariance matrix 
of residuals in the analysis by creating a separate portfolio for my firm characteristic of interest.  
I select the interaction between UTB and R&D as my firm characteristics of interest. 
UTB is calculated as the FIN 48 reserve for uncertain tax benefits (UTB) scaled by total assets 
while R&D is calculated as R&D expense scaled by total assets. I interact these variables for 
three reasons. First, the R&D Tax Credit governed by IRC §41 is the most common uncertain tax 
position filed by corporations with the IRS.12 Therefore, tax regulations related to §41 provide a 
strong setting to identify investor valuation effects of changes in tax uncertainty. Second, R&D 
activities related to §41 are the most easily and cleanly identifiable from financial statements 
compared to other code sections identified by the IRS as exhibiting tax uncertainty.13 Third, to 
triangulate that §41 uncertainty is likely a large proportion of FIN 48 tax reserves that are 
publicly available to investors, I interact R&D with UTB. This approach ensures I am examining 
both a common and material source of tax uncertainty to provide additional power for my tests.  
                                                          
12 https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/utp-filing-statistics. The R&D Tax Credit accounts for 36% of all 
uncertain tax positions reported to the IRS on Schedule UTP in tax year 2014. This share has been steadily 
increasing over time, from 21% in 2010, to 24% in 2011, 25% in 2012, and 31% in 2013. The next most-often 
reported uncertain tax position during tax year 2014 relates to §482 transfer pricing, at 20%. 
13 The other top categories with uncertain tax positions, but for which proxies are difficult to obtain, include (1) 
§482 transfer pricing; (2) §199 domestic production activities deduction; (3) §263 capitalization; and (4) §162 trade 
or business expenses. Furthermore, the share of these tax uncertainties as major issues reported to the IRS on 
Schedule UTP has been steady or decreasing over time. In tax year 2014, the share of tax uncertainties related to 
§482 was 20%; §199 was 4%; §263 capitalization was 3%; and §162 trade or business expenses was 3%. 
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Following both Frischmann et al. (2008) and Donohoe and McGill (2011), I implement 
the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) procedure using the following approach. First, I form an N×2 
matrix, X, having a column of ones and a column containing the firm’s characteristic of interest 
(in my case the of firm’s characteristic of interest is UTB × R&D). Next, I create portfolio 
weights (W) and calculate the portfolio returns (Rpt) as follows: 
(𝑋′𝑋)−1𝑋′ = 𝑊  (6) 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑝𝑡 = 𝑊𝑝
′𝑅𝑖𝑡        𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝 = 1, 2;   𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇;   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁  
where W is the P×N matrix of portfolio weights (p = 2 and N = 4,251).14 Rit represents the N×1 
vector of each sample firms’ stock returns on day t, and therefore, WeightedRpt represents the 
weighted portfolio return on day t. I re-estimate Eqs. (2), (3) and (5) using this new weighted 
portfolio return (WeightedRpt) as my dependent variable on the left-hand side so that estimates of 
𝑔3𝑝𝑘, 𝑔5𝑝𝑙, 𝑔7𝑝𝑚 𝑔15𝑝𝑢 and 𝑔17𝑝𝑣 will reflect the effect of the firm characteristic (i.e., UTB × 
R&D) on the market reaction to the kth, lth, mth , uth, and vth events. If, for example, tests of my 
hypotheses find a positive valuation of tax guidance, then I should find an even stronger positive 
valuation for firms with higher R&D and UTBs, where the effect of reducing tax uncertainty 
should be the strongest. However, small sample sizes may reduce the power of the tests such that 
I will not find an effect. 
Sample Selection 
                                                          
14 In my case, because I have 4,251 firms in my post-FIN 48 sample, Matrix 𝑋 = [𝑁 × 2] is a [4,251 × 2] Matrix 
and therefore my pre-portfolio weight Matrix (W) calculated as 𝑊 = (𝑋′𝑋)−1𝑋′ is a  [2 × 4,251] Matrix. Since I 
am interested in weighting returns based on the firm characteristic of UTB × R&D, I use the second row of Matrix 
W, denoted as 𝑊𝑝
′, which is a [1 × 4,251] Matrix. When multiplied against the matrix of daily firm returns 𝑅𝑖𝑡, 
which is a [4,251 × 1] Matrix (i.e.,  my 𝑊𝑝
′𝑅𝑖𝑡 calculation), I am left with a weighted portfolio return called 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑝𝑡 which is a [1 × 1] Matrix. Because my weighted portfolio consists of all firms on a given day, I form 
one portfolio per day. Since there are 2,015 trading days after FIN 48 in my sample, the number of observations in 
the regressions shrinks from 5,540 to 2,015. 
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My sample consists of 10,273 unique firms covering 5,540 trading days over the period 
1994-2015 to form an unbalanced panel of 85,500 firm-year observations, or 20,158,613 firm-
day observations. This sample consists of firms covered by Compustat that have available CRSP 
daily stock return data from January 1, 1994, through December 31, 2015. I begin in 1994 
because that is the earliest date digitized records of the Federal Register are available. To ensure 
the firm’s stock is traded regularly, I require firms to have positive market value of equity; a 
stock price of at least $1; actively traded common shares on either the NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ markets; sales that are at least $1 million annually; and to be domestically 
incorporated. Additionally, to ensure I focus on firms that have the highest likelihood of being 
impacted by tax regulations, I further require firms to have at least $1 million in total assets 
annually and to be in nonregulated and nonfinancial industries. I use this full sample for tests of 
H1 and H2. However, because I use the Compustat variable TXTUBEND as my proxy for tax 
uncertainty (i.e., the annual ending balance of FIN 48 UTBs), and it is only available for years 
2007-2015 (i.e., post-FIN 48), I test H3 on a reduced subsample consisting of 4,251 unique firms 
covering 2,266 trading days to form an unbalanced panel of 24,444 firm-year observations, or 
6,169,798 firm-day observations.  
Firms are required to report uncertain tax positions to the IRS on their tax return’s 
Schedule UTP. A summary of the top five areas for uncertain tax positions spanning 2010-2014 
was released by the IRS, which I report in Table 1 Panel A. These top five areas and their related 
code sections cover approximately two-thirds of all uncertain tax positions reported to the IRS. 
These code sections are: §41 (R&D Tax Credit), §482 (transfer pricing), §199 (domestic 
production activities deduction), §263 (capitalization), and §162 (trade or business deductions). I 
31 
limit my search of tax regulatory guidance events to these five code sections because they would 
most likely be important to investors concerned about tax uncertainty. 
To determine which dates Treasury provides guidance, I download the title and abstract 
of all regulatory filings made by Treasury with the Federal Register. Next, I search the titles and 
abstracts for references to the top five uncertain code sections (e.g., “§41”, “Section 482”, “Sec. 
199”, “263”, etc.) or words and phrases most likely to identify the code sections in case the 
section number was not referenced in the title or abstract (e.g., “Research”, “Transfer Pricing”, 
Domestic Production”, etc.). Then, I read through all the titles and abstracts and remove any 
documents my search incorrectly identified as relating to these top five code sections. This 
produces 200 regulatory documents. The last step includes reading through each of these 200 
documents to ensure they are actual informative regulatory events. A summary of removed 
events is reported Table 1 Panel B. Of the 200 documents I examined, 47 related to corrections 
(e.g., spelling error), 12 related to hearings (e.g., location changes), and 1 related to the 
withdrawal of a Proposed Regulation. I remove documents relating to corrections and hearings 
because they contain minor information that is not new or material, and therefore should be 
irrelevant to investors concerned with tax uncertainty. While the withdrawal of a Proposed 
Regulation is certainly new information (i.e., Treasury withdrew their position on the issue) and 
is very relevant to investors concerned about tax uncertainty, I still remove it because as a sole 
event over my 22-year sample, it is unclear if any meaningful inferences could be drawn upon its 
inclusion. The sample selection process leaves 140 regulatory events for which clear, new, and 
potentially material tax policy guidance is issued by Treasury. 
Descriptive Statistics 
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Descriptive statistics on my dependent and control variables are reported in Table 2 Panel 
A. All variables, except UTB, are reported for the full sample (1994 through 2015) used in H1 
and H2 and consists of 85,500 firm-year observations and 5,540 daily observations. H2 splits the 
full sample into pre- and post-FIN 48 subsamples,15 which consist of 61,056 vs. 24,444 firm-year 
observations and 3,274 vs. 2,266 daily observations. UTB, which is a lagged variable used in H3, 
is reported on a subsample of the post-FIN 48 (2008 through 2015)16 and consists of 21,728 
firm-year observations and 2,015 daily observations. 
As shown in Table 2 Panel B, of the tax regulations issued during my sample period the 
RFC (ANPRM) occurs the most (least) at 42% (1%) of the time, while Proposed, Temporary, 
and Final Regulations occur between 15-21% of the time. Regulations regarding R&D, transfer 
pricing, and capitalization occur much more frequently (at 39%, 26%, and 21%, respectively) 
than the domestic production activities deduction (9%) and trade or business expenses (6%).  
As shown in Table 2 Panel C, the number of regulations before and after FIN 48 in my 
sample is roughly evenly split with 80 regulations (or 6.2 per year) being issued before FIN 48 
and 60 (or 6.7 per year) being issued after FIN 48. Each code section is fairly evenly balanced as 
well, except for capitalization which has triple the regulations in the pre-FIN 48 period.  
As shown in Table 2 Panel D, regulations are the least frequently issued in the middle of 
the week on a Wednesday (21) and most frequently, but evenly stacked, at both the beginning 
(Monday) and end of the week (Friday) (33 and 32). Because these ratios are not drastically 
different, and because both Mondays and Fridays are evenly populated, I am not concerned that 
my results are driven by a weekday effect. 
  
                                                          
15 The pre-FIN 48 period is 1994 through 2006 and the post-FIN 48 period is 2007 through 2015. 
16 Because I use lagged UTB, and UTBs are first reported in 2007, my post-FIN 48 subsample reported numbers and 
regressions are reported using 2008-2015. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS  
 
Investor Valuation of Tax Guidance (H1) 
To test H1 on the investor valuation of tax guidance events, I estimate Eq. (1). 
Cumulative portfolio abnormal returns (CAR) are my dependent variable. Results are reported in 
Table 3. I first report both Fama-French’s three- and five-factor models as a baseline 
specification in Columns (1) and (2). Results are consistent with prior research. 
Turning to the main results, I first examine the total average impact of all tax guidance 
issued by Treasury over my 22-year sample period. To do so, I test the market’s change in 
valuation by examining the aggregate effect of tax regulations on firms’ stock returns. I set 
GUIDEkt equal to one for the three-day window surrounding each of the 140 tax guidance event 
dates. Column (3) reports in percentage format the CAR for all tax guidance events. The CAR is 
estimated by the coefficient g1pk from Eq. (1). I find no relation, on average, between tax 
guidance and investor valuation (CAR=0.012; p=0.81).17 
As mentioned above, these 140 tax regulations relate to five different code sections. As 
evidenced by Table 1 Panel A, each code section has a different number of uncertain positions 
filed with the IRS, thus it is entirely possible that investors might value guidance differently for 
each key issue. As such, I re-estimate Eq. (1) by setting GUIDEkt equal to one for the three-day 
window surrounding each regulation date, but only for tax regulations related to §41. I report 
results in Column (4). I repeat this estimation four more times—for §482, §199, §263, and 
§162—and report the results in Columns (5) to (8).  
                                                          
17 To mitigate the potential that outlier returns are driving the results, in an untabulated analysis I winsorize returns 
and rerun all tests and find that magnitude and significance are not materially changed. 
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Upon splitting guidance into separate code sections, I uncover important variation 
compared to the initial aggregate examination in Column (3). I find a significantly positive CAR 
for §41 (CAR=0.198; p<0.01), a significantly negative CAR for §199 (CAR = −0.327; p=0.04) 
and §263 (CAR = −0.188; p=0.04), and an insignificant CAR for §482 (CAR=0.080; p=0.38) 
and §162 (CAR=0.117; p=0.50). With three of the five code sections providing evidence of 
abnormal returns, I reject the null of H1 and conclude that guidance through tax regulations is 
priced by investors. In other words, tax policy guidance provides new information to investors as 
they make assessments of valuations for public corporations. 
Valuation of Guidance pre- versus post-FIN 48 (H2) 
I estimate Eq. (2) to examine whether the investor valuation of tax guidance changes after 
tax uncertainty became more prominent in firms’ financial statements with the implementation of 
FIN 48. I set PreGUIDEkt (PostGUIDEkt) equal to one for the three-day window surrounding 
each of the 80 (60) tax regulation dates occurring before (after) FIN 48, or a cut-off of January 1, 
2007. Results are reported in Table 4. Column (1) reports in percentage format the CAR for pre-
FIN 48 (post FIN 48) tax guidance events and is estimated by the coefficient g2pk (g3pk) from Eq. 
(2). I find a significantly negative valuation of pre-FIN 48 tax regulations (CAR = -0.347; 
p<0.01) and a significantly positive valuation of post-FIN48 tax regulations (CAR=0.507; 
p<0.01). An F-test finds that the pre- vs. post-FIN 48 coefficients are statistically different 
(F=96.15; p<0.01), suggesting that investors value guidance significantly more positively post-
FIN 48 than they did pre-FIN 48.  
To further examine the results, I re-estimate Eq. (2) by setting PreGUIDEkt 
(PostGUIDEkt) equal to one for the three-day window surrounding each pre-FIN 48 (post-FIN 
48) regulation date, but only for tax regulations related to §41. I report these results in Column 
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(2). I repeat this estimation four more times—for §482, §199, §263, and §162—and report the 
results in Columns (3) to (6).  
Splitting the pre-FIN 48 and post-FIN 48 event dates into separate code sections exhibits 
similar results to the aggregate pre- and post-FIN 48 results. For the pre-FIN 48 period, I find a 
significantly negative investor valuation for four out of the five code sections (§482, §199, §263, 
and §162), with the fifth section being marginally negative (§41). For the post-FIN 48 period, I 
find a significantly positive investor valuation for three of the five code sections (§41, §482, and 
§162), with one being marginally positive (§162). Testing the difference between the pre-FIN 48 
and post-FIN 48 coefficients reveals that all five code sections have a significantly more positive 
investor valuation after FIN 48 than before FIN 48 (F = 23.54, 28.12, 7.03, 10.90, and 117.50; p 
< 0.01 for all five). With all five code sections providing evidence inconsistent with H2, I reject 
the null hypothesis and conclude that guidance through tax regulations is valued more positively 
during the post-FIN 48 period when information about tax uncertainty is publicly disclosed on 
firms’ financial statements and likely more salient to investors concerned about tax uncertainty. 
Next, I use Eq. (3) to examine whether the investor valuation of tax guidance is due to 
actual guidance or the anticipation of receiving guidance. I split Eq. (2)’s PreGUIDEkt 
(PostGUIDEkt) into PreAnticipatedGUIDElt (PostAnticipatedGUIDElt) when regulations did not 
reveal Treasury’s position on a tax issue, and PreActualGUIDEmt (PostActualGUIDEmt) when 
regulations did reveal Treasury’s position on a tax issue, both pre- and post-FIN 48. Results are 
reported in Table 5. Column (1) reports in percentage format the CAR for pre-FIN 48 (post-FIN 
48) Anticipated Guidance, which is estimated by g4pl (g5pl) from Eq. (3), as well as for pre-FIN 
48 (post-FIN 48) Actual Guidance, which is estimated by g6pm (g7pm) from Eq. (3). I find no 
significant difference between Anticipated Guidance in the pre- vs. post-FIN 48 periods (F=0.25; 
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p=0.62). However, I find a significantly positive difference between Actual Guidance in the pre- 
vs. post-FIN 48 periods (F=6.41; p=0.01). This result provides additional evidence of a 
differential change in investor valuation in favor of actual guidance over the anticipation of 
guidance in a post-FIN 48 era. 
To further examine the difference between anticipated and actual guidance, I re-estimate 
Eq. (3) by setting PreAnticipatedGUIDElt (PostAnticipatedGUIDElt) [PreActualGUIDEmt] 
{PostActualGUIDEmt} equal to one for the three-day window surrounding each Anticipated 
Guidance regulation event pre-FIN 48 (Anticipated post-FIN 48) [Actual pre-FIN 48] {Actual 
post-FIN 48}, for tax regulations related to §41. I report results in Column (2). I repeat this 
estimation four more times—for §482, §199, §263, and §162—and report the results in Columns 
(3) to (6). 
Splitting Anticipated Guidance and Actual Guidance into separate code sections exhibits 
similar results to the aggregate Anticipated vs. Actual Guidance results above. For the pre-FIN 
48 era, I find no significantly different investor valuation between Anticipated Guidance and 
Actual Guidance for all three sections that issue a RFC (§41, §482, and §263; F = 0.64, 0.02, and 
0.09; p = 0.42, 0.88, and 0.76, respectively). In the post-FIN 48 era, I find a significantly positive 
investor valuation for Actual over Anticipated Guidance for two of the three code sections (§41, 
§482), and a directionally positive valuation for the remaining one (§263) (F = 6.76, 17.67, and 
1.93; p = 0.01, <0.01, and 0.16, respectively). Taken together, these results indicate a large 
differential change in investor valuation in favor of actual guidance over the anticipation of 
guidance in a post-FIN 48 era. 
Next, to provide evidence that the pre- vs. post-FIN 48 results are actually due to a 
reduction in uncertainty, I use Eq. (4) to examine whether the investor valuation of tax guidance 
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pre- vs. post-FIN 48 when holding the direction of cash flow news constant. I split Eq. (3)’s 
PreActualGUIDEmt (PostActualGUIDEmt) into PreNegativeGUIDEat (PostNegativeGUIDEat) 
when cash flow news from regulations is expected to be detrimental to taxpayers, 
PreNeutralGUIDErt (PostNeutralGUIDErt) when there is no expected direct cash flow impact 
from regulations, and PrePositiveGUIDEst (PostPositiveGUIDEst) when cash flow news from 
regulations is expected to be beneficial to taxpayers. Results are reported in Table 6 in 
percentage format for the CAR for pre- and post-FIN 48 Negative (Positive) Guidance news, 
which is estimated by g8pq and g9pq (g12ps and g13ps) from Eq. (4). I find a significant difference 
between Negative Guidance news in the pre- vs. post-FIN 48 periods (F=56.02; p<0.01), which 
provides strong evidence that the differential change in valuation pre- vs. post-FIN 48 is not due 
to a change in news since the direction of news is held constant. Interestingly, I find no 
significant difference between Positive Guidance in the pre- vs. post-FIN 48 periods (F=1.20; 
p=0.27), which suggests that the differential change in valuation of Acutal Guidance in the pre- 
vs. post-FIN 48 period is primarily being driven by investors increased appreciation for guidance 
in the presence of bad news.  
Next, I use Eq. (5) to examine whether the investor valuation is contingent on whether 
the guidance has the force of law. I split Eq. (3)’s PreActualGUIDEmt (PostActualGUIDEmt) into 
PreActualGUIDEwoForceut (PostActualGUIDEwoForceut) when regulations provide guidance 
but do not have the force of law requiring the guidance to be implemented, and 
PreActualGUIDEwForcevt (PostActualGUIDEwForcevt) when regulations provide guidance that 
have the force of law. Results are reported in Table 7. Column (1) reports in percentage format 
the CAR for pre- and post-FIN 48 With (Without) Force Guidance, which is estimated by g14pu 
and g15pu (g16pv and g17pv) from Eq. (5). I find the pre-FIN 48 With Force Guidance to be 
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significantly more negative than the pre-FIN 48 Without Force Guidance (F=4.51; p=0.03). 
Conversely, I find the post-FIN 48 With Force Guidance to be significantly more positive than 
the post-FIN 48 Without Force Guidance (F=5.71; p=0.02). These results provide evidence that 
guidance which has the force of law elicits, on average, a stronger investor reaction than 
guidance that does not have the force of law. 
Similar to before, I re-estimate Eq. (5) for tax regulations related to each of the code 
sections separately (§41, §482, §199, §263, and §162) and report the results in Columns (2) to 
(6). Half of the individual code section results are significant in the same direction as Column 
(1), providing strong support that guidance with the force of law elicits a strong market reaction 
than without the force of law. The sole exception is post-FIN 48 guidance for the §41 R&D Tax 
Credit which investors react more strongly to guidance without the force of law.18 These results 
should be interpreted with caution given that each split further shrinks the sample size.  
Variation in Investor Valuation by Level of Uncertain Tax Positions (H3) 
To test whether investor valuation varies by differing levels of tax uncertainties, I re-
estimate Eq. (2) using portfolio returns that are weighted by the firm characteristic UTB × R&D 
using the methodology laid out in Eq. (6). I estimate Eq. (6) using portfolio returns that are 
weighted by the firm characteristic UTB × R&D. Note that because UTB is only available post-
FIN 48, I do not estimate the pre-FIN 48 variable 𝑔2𝑝𝑘 from Eq. (2). By using weighted portfolio 
returns, the estimate of 𝑔3𝑝𝑘 reflects the effect of the firm characteristic UTB × R&D on investor 
valuation. Additionally, I set PostGUIDEkt equal to one for the three-day window surrounding 
each (post-FIN 48) regulation date, but only for tax regulations that directly relate R&D expenses 
(i.e., §41 R&D Regulations). Results are reported in Table 8. Column (1) reports in percentage 
                                                          
18 Where the R&D Tax Credit is the most uncertain tax code section, investors may pay more attention to proposed 
regulations and incorporate them more fully before they become finalized, as compared to other code sections.  
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format the CAR for tax guidance events and is estimated by the coefficient 𝑔3𝑝𝑘. I find no 
relation between tax guidance and investor valuation (CAR=0.001; p=0.49), providing initial 
evidence consistent with the null in H3. 
To further investigate whether valuation varies by differing levels of UTB, I re-estimate 
Eq. (3) using portfolio returns that are weighted by the firm characteristic UTB × R&D using the 
methodology laid out in Eq. (6). By using weighted portfolio returns, the estimates of 𝑔5𝑝𝑙, 
𝑔7𝑝𝑚, 𝑔15𝑝𝑢, and 𝑔17𝑝𝑣 reflect the effect of the firm characteristic UTB × R&D on investor 
valuation. Again, because UTB is only available post-FIN 48, I do not estimate the pre-FIN 48 
variables 𝑔4𝑝𝑙 and 𝑔6𝑝𝑚 from Eq. (3) and 𝑔14𝑝𝑢 and 𝑔16𝑝𝑣 from Eq. (5). I set 
PostAnticipatedGUIDElt (PostActualGUIDEmt) [PostWithoutForceGUIDEut] 
{PostWithForceGUIDEvt} equal to one for the three-day window surrounding each post-FIN 48 
regulation date, but only for guidance related to §41. Column (2) reports in percentage format the 
CAR for tax guidance events and is estimated by the coefficients of 𝑔5𝑝𝑙 and 𝑔7𝑝𝑚 from Eq. (3). 
I find no relation between Anticipated Guidance and investor valuation (CAR=0.001; p=0.28). 
However, I find a significantly positive relation between Actual Guidance and investor valuation 
(CAR=0.005; p<0.01). This result provides evidence that in the post-FIN 48 era, actual tax 
regulations are more positively valued as the firm’s uncertain tax activities (R&D) and positions 
(UTBs) increase. Column (3) reports in percentage format the CAR for tax guidance events and 
is estimated by the coefficients of 𝑔15𝑝𝑢, and 𝑔17𝑝𝑣 from Eq. (5). I find a significantly positive 
relation between Without Force Guidance and investor valuation (CAR=0.006; p<0.01). 
However, I find an insignificant relation between With Force Guidance and investor valuation 
(CAR=0.004; p=0.14). Overall, the results are consistent with tax policy guidance being viewed 
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as value-enhancing by investors, especially in periods of high salience of and materiality in 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
 
The primary purpose of the tax policy regulatory process is to provide formal guidance in 
assisting taxpayers in determining and paying the correct amount of tax. However, it is unclear 
whether investors would find tax guidance valuable. On the one hand, Treasury helps fill in gaps 
in the tax law that may help taxpayers avoid costly future audits and penalties in the event non-
compliance is discovered. In this case, one would expect a positive market reaction by investors 
to guidance. However, if guidance closes lucrative tax planning strategies or creates additional 
compliance costs, then one would expect a negative market reaction by investors to guidance. 
Using a hand-collected sample of 140 events surrounding the release of tax policy 
guidance over the period 1994 to 2015, I use a Multivariate Regression Method to test the 
investor reaction to this guidance. Over the full sample period, the results depend on the tax 
regulation being tested. For example, tax regulations related to the R&D tax credit are positively 
valued in the aggregate, but regulations related to the domestic production activities deduction 
and capitalization rules produce a negative aggregate market reaction. 
However, the results sharpen as I split the sample in the pre- vs. post-FIN 48 periods. FIN 
48 became effective for fiscal years 2007 and later, during which firms were required to publicly 
disclose uncertain tax positions in their financial statements, creating heightened awareness by 
investors of these positions. I find that in the pre-FIN 48 period when cash tax savings were the 
primary focus, investors negatively value tax policy guidance, but in the post-FIN 48 period 
when the saliency of tax uncertainty is heightened, investors positively value tax policy 
guidance. This positive valuation effect post-FIN 48 holds for both actual guidance issued, as 
well as for indications that Treasury is considering issuing guidance, although the effect is more 
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pronounced for the actual guidance. Additionally, this post-FIN 48 positive valuation effect 
holds regardless of whether the guidance has the force of law or not, but the effect is more 
pronounced for guidance that does have the force of law. However, this post-FIN 48 positive 
valuation effect only holds for negative guidance news and not positive guidance news, which 
helps confirm that the change in valuation is due to a reduction in uncertainty.  Finally, I find that 
investors in firms with larger tax uncertainties—or greater R&D activities and FIN 48 tax 
reserves—value tax policy guidance incrementally more positively than firms with smaller tax 
uncertainties. Collectively, my evidence shows that Treasury’s activities of issuing guidance to 
assist taxpayers in complying with tax law is negatively valued by investors pre-FIN 48 when tax 
uncertainty was less salient, but is now positively and significantly valued by investors post-
FIN48 when tax uncertainty is more salient. 
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it shows that investors price 
the most prominent form of tax guidance, Treasury Regulations. Second, it shows that during a 
period of high salience of tax uncertainty, i.e., during FIN 48, Treasury Regulations positively 
affects investors’ valuation of tax guidance. Third, it shows that firms with the largest tax 
uncertainties are the ones who benefit the most from Treasury’s issuances of tax guidance. 
  
43 
FIGURES & TABLES  
 








FIGURE 2 – VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
Rpt is the mean portfolio return less the risk-free rate calculated as the mean of the 
daily return less the risk-free return (RET – RF)  
WeightedRpt is the weighted portfolio return calculated using the firm characteristic of 
UTB×R&D 
UTB is calculated as lagged Unrecognized Tax Benefits scaled by lagged total assets 
[TXTUBEND/AT] with missing values of TXTUBEND set equal to zero for 
fiscal years after 2006. 
R&D is calculated as R&D expense scaled by lagged total assets [XRD/AT] with 
missing values of XRD set equal to zero. 
Ln_Assets is calculated as the lagged natural log of total assets [ln(AT)] 
(Rmt – Rft) is the excess return on the market, value-weight return of all CRSP firms 
incorporated in the US and listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ that have 
a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 at the beginning of month t, good shares and 
price data at the beginning of t, and good return data for t minus the one-month 
Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). This variable is downloaded from 
Fama/French’s daily 5 Factors (2x3) website. 
SMB is the average return on the nine small stock portfolios minus the average return 
on the nine big stock portfolios. This Small Minus Big variable is downloaded 
from Fama/French’s daily 5 Factors (2x3) website. 
HML is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the 
two growth portfolios. This High Minus Low variable is downloaded from 
Fama/French’s daily 5 Factors (2x3) website. 
RMW is the average return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios minus 
the average return on the two weak operating profitability portfolios. This 
Robust Minus Weak variable is downloaded from Fama/French’s daily 5 
Factors (2x3) website. 
CMA is the average return on the two conservative investment portfolios minus the 
average return on the two aggressive investment portfolios. This Conservative 




Table 1 – Panel A 
Uncertain Tax Position Filing Statistics Released by the IRS (2010-2014): 
   Uncertain Tax Position Category: # of UTPs % Total UTPs 
§41 R&D Positions 8,634 30% 
§482 Transfer Pricing Positions 6,680 24% 
§199 Domestic Production Positions 1,386 5% 
§263 Capitalization Positions 1,576 6% 
§162 Trade & Business Positions 819 3% 





















Table 1 – Panel B 
Treasury Filings with the Federal Register 
  
 Total 
Related to §41, §482, §199, §263, or §162: 200  
     Less: Corrections (e.g., spelling errors) (47) 
     Less: Hearings (e.g., location change) (12) 
     Less: Withdrawal of a Proposed Regulation (1) 
Total Regulatory Filings Used 140  
Note: After downloading from the Federal Register 
(https://www.federalregister.gov/) and searching the title and abstract for the code 
sections (e.g., “§41”) and key phrases (e.g., “Transfer Pricing”), I found 200 
documents relating to the top five UTP code sections designated by the IRS. 
Corrections and hearings are removed because they do not contain new or 
material information and therefore should be irrelevant to investors concerned 
with tax uncertainty. The withdrawal of a Proposed Regulation is only removed 
because it is unclear if any meaningful inferences could be drawn from observing 
a single instance of an event over my 22-year sample period of 1994 to 2015 
(inclusive). The Government Publishing Office (GPO) is in the process of 
digitizing the Federal Register back to 1936, but to date has only released 




Table 2 – Panel A 
Descriptive Statistics 













Independent Variables        
  UTB 0.007  0.012  0  0.001  0.009  21,728 
  R&D 0.052  0.102  0  0  0.060  85,500 
  Assets 5.699  2.074  4.176  5.588  7.106  85,500 
            
Control Variables            
  (Rmt – Rft) 0.031  1.187  -0.490  0.070  0.590  5,540 
  SMB 0.006  0.595  -0.330  0.020  0.340  5,540 
  HML 0.010  0.632  -0.270  0  0.270  5,540 
  RMW 0.017  0.499  -0.210  0.010  0.240  5,540 
  CMA 0.012  0.436  -0.200  0  0.210  5,540 
                        
Note: Independent variables are summarized as firm-year averages since these are input to the 
cumulative portfolio abnormal return weighting procedure. All other variables are summarized as trading 
days. N of 85,500 (21,728) is the number of firm-year observations in the full (sub) sample and 5,540 are 
the number of trading days. Continuous independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles, which are winsorized at zero and one. Unless otherwise indicated, variables are measured in 
year t. Variables are defined in Figure 2. 
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Table 2 – Panel B 
Top Five Uncertain Tax Positions – By Type and Code Section 
























Request for Comments (RFC)  30  18    11    59 (42%) 
Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPRM) 
 1      1    2 (1%) 
Proposed Regulations (NPRM)  9  5  3  7  4  28 (20%) 
Temporary Regulations  6  8  4  3    21 (15%) 
Final Regulations  8  6  5  7  4  30 (21%) 
Total  54  37  12  29  8  140 (100%) 
  
Note: Regulations were downloaded from the Federal Register (https://www.federalregister.gov/). I read through each regulation and 
coded it as one of five regulation types above. 
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Table 2 – Panel C 
Top Five Uncertain Tax Positions – By Year and Code Section 




















1994   3    1  1  5 
1995         1  1 
1996   2    1    3 
1997 1      4    5 
1998 2      2    4 
1999   2    2    4 
2000 3  1    2    6 
2001 3  1    1    5 
2002 3  2    3    8 
2003 2  4    1    7 
2004 5  1    3    9 
2005 2  4  1  1  1  9 
2006 2  4  6  1  1  14 
Pre-FIN48 
Total 
23  24  7  22  4  80 
            
2007 7  1  2  1    11 
2008 4  3  2  2  1  12 
2009 1  3        4 
2010 5  1    1  1  8 
2011 3  2    2    7 
2013 5      1  1  7 
2014 1        1  2 
2015 5  3  1      9 
Post-FIN48 
Total 
31  13  5  7  4  60 
            
Grand 
Total 
54  37  12  29  8  140 
 









Table 2 – Panel D 
Top Five Uncertain Tax Positions – By Year and Weekday 
            
 Monday  Tuesday  Wednesday  Thursday  Friday  Total 
1994 
    
2 
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1996 2 
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1999 2 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GUIDE   0.012 0.198*** 0.080 -0.327** -0.188** 0.117 
   (0.24) (2.59) (0.87) (-2.04) (-2.03) (0.68) 
(Rmt – Rft) 0.906*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.886*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 
 (78.53) (68.66) (68.65) (68.62) (68.62) (68.69) (68.69) (68.66) 
SMB 0.745*** 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.743*** 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.745*** 0.745*** 
 (33.59) (31.74) (31.73) (31.69) (31.75) (31.70) (31.78) (31.74) 
HML 0.208*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (8.94) (3.05) (3.05) (3.02) (3.05) (3.06) (3.04) (3.05) 
RMW  -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.091*** 
  (-2.82) (-2.82) (-2.83) (-2.81) (-2.82) (-2.83) (-2.81) 
CMA  -0.037 -0.037 -0.036 -0.038 -0.037 -0.036 -0.037 
  (-1.02) (-1.01) (-0.97) (-1.02) (-1.01) (-0.99) (-1.01) 
Constant -0.957*** -0.954*** -0.955*** -0.959*** -0.956*** -0.953*** -0.952*** -0.955*** 
 (-78.95) (-78.91) (-76.41) (-78.35) (-78.29) (-78.59) (-78.06) (-78.76) 
R-squared 0.625 0.629 0.629 0.630 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.629 
Observations 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 
Note: This table reports the estimates of Equation (1) using OLS. All columns use a dependent variable of Rpt which is the return on 
portfolio p on day t (t = t, 2, …, T). T is the total number of daily return observations from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 
2015 (in this case T = 5,540). GUIDE is an indicator variable equal to 1 during the three-day period (t = –1, 0, +1) around the 
regulatory event date. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-
statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Variables are defined in Figure 2. 
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Table 4 
Market Response to Treasury Guidance – Pre vs. Post FIN48 
  
Dependent Variable Rpt 






















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PreGUIDE -0.347*** -0.179* -0.249*** -0.728*** -0.343*** -0.921*** 
 (-6.32) (-1.68) (-2.88) (-10.16) (-3.45) (-6.60) 
PostGUIDE 0.507*** 0.503*** 0.708*** -0.086 0.327* 0.809*** 
 (7.26) (5.39) (4.44) (-0.37) (1.84) (10.25) 
(Rmt – Rft) 0.884*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 
 (69.10) (68.84) (68.83) (68.72) (68.69) (68.56) 
SMB 0.749*** 0.744*** 0.745*** 0.744*** 0.746*** 0.746*** 
 (32.19) (31.81) (31.91) (31.73) (31.81) (31.87) 
HML 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (2.96) (3.05) (2.95) (3.04) (3.04) (3.06) 
RMW -0.095*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.092*** -0.094*** 
 (-2.96) (-2.89) (-2.81) (-2.82) (-2.86) (-2.93) 
CMA -0.031 -0.034 -0.037 -0.037 -0.035 -0.036 
 (-0.85) (-0.92) (-1.01) (-1.00) (-0.96) (-0.98) 
Constant -0.955*** -0.959*** -0.956*** -0.953*** -0.952*** -0.955*** 
 (-76.40) (-78.35) (-78.28) (-78.58) (-78.05) (-78.74) 
R-squared 0.634 0.631 0.631 0.630 0.630 0.631 
Observations 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 
Difference of Coefficients       
PostGUIDE –  PreGUIDE = 0 0.854*** 0.682*** 0.957*** 0.642*** 0.670*** 1.73*** 
[F-Stat] [96.15] [23.54] [28.12] [7.03] [10.90] [117.50] 
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 Table 4 (continued) 
Market Response to Treasury Guidance – Pre vs. Post FIN48 
Note: This table reports the estimates of Equation (2) using OLS. All columns use a dependent variable of Rpt which is 
the return on portfolio p on day t (t = t, 2, …, T). T is the total number of daily return observations from January 1, 1994 
through December 31, 2015 (in this case T = 5,540). PreGUIDE (PostGUIDE) is an indicator variable equal to 1 during 
the three-day period (t = –1, 0, +1) around the regulatory event date occurring before (after) FIN48. *, **, *** denotes 
statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
based on robust standard errors. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to 
mitigate the effect of outliers. Variables are defined in Figure 2. 
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Table 5 
Market Response to Treasury Guidance – Anticipated vs. Actual  
  
Dependent Variable Rpt 






















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PreAnticipatedGUIDE -0.290*** -0.180 -0.261** n/a -0.375*** n/a 
 (-3.33) (-1.24) (-1.97) n/a (-2.59) n/a 
PreActualGUIDE -0.344*** -0.015 -0.236** -0.728*** -0.316** -0.921*** 
 (-4.93) (-0.10) (-2.19) (-10.16) (-2.34) (-6.60) 
PostAnticipatedGUIDE 0.326*** 0.354*** 0.320* n/a 0.093 n/a 
 (3.28) (2.67) (1.79) n/a (0.35) n/a 
PostActualGUIDE 0.703*** 0.867*** 1.389*** -0.086 0.562*** 0.809*** 
 (7.70) (11.35) (7.68) (-0.37) (2.72) (10.25) 
(Rmt – Rft) 0.884*** 0.885*** 0.884*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 
 (68.99) (68.85) (68.85) (68.72) (68.61) (68.56) 
SMB 0.750*** 0.744*** 0.746*** 0.744*** 0.746*** 0.746*** 
 (32.22) (31.79) (32.00) (31.73) (31.80) (31.87) 
HML 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (2.92) (3.01) (2.90) (3.04) (3.05) (3.06) 
RMW -0.095*** -0.093*** -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.094*** 
 (-2.94) (-2.89) (-2.72) (-2.82) (-2.87) (-2.93) 
CMA -0.031 -0.032 -0.038 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 
 (-0.84) (-0.87) (-1.02) (-1.00) (-0.97) (-0.98) 
Constant -0.956*** -0.960*** -0.956*** -0.953*** -0.952*** -0.955*** 
 (-76.47) (-78.39) (-78.27) (-78.58) (-78.04) (-78.74) 
R-squared 0.634 0.631 0.632 0.630 0.630 0.631 
Observations 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 
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 Table 5 (continued) 
Market Response to Treasury Guidance – Anticipated vs. Actual 
Difference of Coefficients       
PreActualGUIDE –  
PreAnticipatedGUIDE = 0 -0.054 0.165 0.025 n/a 0.059 n/a 
[F-Stat] [0.25] [0.64] [0.02]  [0.09]  
PostActualGUIDE –  
PostAnticipatedGUIDE = 0 0.344** 0.411*** 1.069*** n/a 0.469 n/a 
[F-Stat] [6.41] [6.76] [17.67]  [1.93]  
PostAnticipatedGUIDE –  
PreAnticipatedGUIDE = 0 0.617*** 0.534*** 0.581*** n/a 0.468 n/a 
[F-Stat] [22.21] [7.38] [6.85]  [2.38]  
PostActualGUIDE –  
PreActualGUIDE = 0 1.015*** 0.78*** 1.625*** 0.642*** 0.878*** 1.73*** 
[F-Stat] [8.1] [21.19] [59.94] [7.03] [12.73] [117.5] 
Note: This table reports the estimates of Equation (3) using OLS. All columns use a dependent variable of Rpt which is 
the return on portfolio p on day t (t = t, 2, …, T). T is the total number of daily return observations from January 1, 
1994 through December 31, 2015 (in this case T = 5,540). PreAnticipatedGUIDE and PostAnticipatedGUIDE  
(PreActualGUIDE and PostActualGUIDE) are indicator variables set equal to 1 during the three-day period (t = –1, 0, 
+1) around the regulatory event dates where RFC and ANPRMN (Proposed, Temporary, and Final) Regulations occur. 
The Pre (Post) prefix designates the regulatory events occurred before (after) FIN48. *, **, *** denotes statistical 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
robust standard errors. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate 
the effect of outliers. Variables are defined in Figure 2. 
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Table 6 
Market Response to Treasury Guidance – Negative vs. Positive 
    





 (1)   
PreAnticipatedGUIDE -0.272*   
 (-1.84)   
PreNegativeGUIDE -0.275*   
 (-1.92)   
PreNeutralGUIDE n/a   
 n/a   
PrePositiveGUIDE 0.669***   
 (4.82)   
PostAnticipatedGUIDE 0.353***   
 (2.66)   
PostNegativeGUIDE 0.903***   
 (13.28)   
PostNeutralGUIDE 0.013   
 (0.22)   
PostPositiveGUIDE 1.002***   
 (20.80)   
(Rmt – Rft) 0.884***   
 (68.70)   
SMB 0.746***   
 (31.89)   
HML 0.078***   
 (3.06)   
RMW -0.091***   
 (-2.83)   
CMA -0.037   
 (-1.00)   
Constant -0.959***   
 (-78.36)   
R-squared 0.632   
Observations 2,266   
Difference of Coefficients    
PreNegativeGUIDE –  
PostNegativeGUIDE = 0 
1.178*** 
  
[F-Stat] [56.02]   
PrePositiveGUIDE –  
PostPositiveGUIDE = 0 
0.333 
  


















Table 6 (continued) 
Market Response to Treasury Guidance – Negative vs. Positive 
Note: This table reports the estimates of Equation (4) using OLS. All columns 
use a dependent variable of Rpt which is the return on portfolio p on day t (t = 
t, 2, …, T). T is the total number of daily return observations from January 1, 
1994 through December 31, 2015 (in this case T = 5,540). 
PreNegativeGUIDE and PostNegativeGUIDE  (PreNeutralGUIDE and 
PostNeutralGUIDE) [PrePositiveGUIDE and PostPositiveGUIDE] are 
indicator variables set equal to 1 during the three-day period (t = –1, 0, +1) 
around the regulatory event dates where guidance has a negative (neutral) 
[positive] effect on cash flows. The Pre (Post) prefix designates the regulatory 
events occurred before (after) FIN48. *, **, *** denotes statistical 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. All continuous 
independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate 
the effect of outliers. Variables are defined in Figure 2. 
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Table 7 
Market Response to Treasury Guidance – Force of Law  
  
Dependent Variable Rpt 






















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PreAnticipatedGUIDE -0.288*** -0.174 -0.261** n/a -0.375*** n/a 
 (-3.27) (-1.19) (-1.97) n/a (-2.59) n/a 
PreWithoutForceGUIDE -0.186* 0.060 0.009 -0.490*** -0.271 -0.729*** 
 (-1.87) (0.35) (0.06) (-9.40) (-1.27) (-3.81) 
PreWithForceGUIDE -0.473*** -0.092 -0.398*** -0.847*** -0.353** -1.113*** 
 (-5.11) (-0.40) (-2.90) (-14.07) (-2.06) (-6.57) 
PostAnticipatedGUIDE 0.337*** 0.354*** 0.320* n/a 0.093 n/a 
 (3.38) (2.67) (1.79) n/a (0.35) n/a 
PostWithoutForceGUIDE 0.299 1.030*** n/a -0.990*** -0.296*** 0.521*** 
 (1.64) (17.10) n/a (-22.55) (-3.60) (2.99) 
PostWithForceGUIDE 0.792*** 0.770*** 1.389*** 0.140 0.990*** 0.953*** 
 (7.56) (7.08) (7.67) (0.56) (21.97) (29.38) 
(Rmt – Rft) 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.884*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 
 (69.13) (68.71) (68.86) (68.70) (68.69) (68.58) 
SMB 0.750*** 0.743*** 0.746*** 0.745*** 0.746*** 0.746*** 
 (32.21) (31.76) (32.02) (31.75) (31.81) (31.84) 
HML 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (2.93) (3.02) (2.89) (3.05) (3.07) (3.06) 
RMW -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.087*** -0.091*** -0.092*** -0.095*** 
 (-2.92) (-2.91) (-2.71) (-2.83) (-2.86) (-2.94) 
CMA -0.032 -0.033 -0.038 -0.037 -0.035 -0.036 
 (-0.88) (-0.91) (-1.02) (-1.01) (-0.95) (-0.98) 
Constant -0.955*** -0.960*** -0.956*** -0.953*** -0.952*** -0.955*** 
 (-76.47) (-78.42) (-78.27) (-78.57) (-78.03) (-78.73) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Market Response to Treasury Guidance – Force of Law 
R-squared 0.635 0.631 0.632 0.630 0.630 0.631 
Observations 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 
Difference of Coefficients       
PreWithForceGUIDE –   
PreWithoutForceGUIDE = 0 
-0.287** -0.152 -0.407** -0.357*** -0.082 -0.384 
[F-Stat] [4.51] [0.28] [4.17] [21.15] [0.09] [2.27] 
PostWithForceGUIDE –   
PostWithoutForceGUIDE = 0 
0.493** -0.26** n/a 1.13*** 1.286*** 0.432** 
[F-Stat] [5.71] [4.46] n/a [19.94] [193.65] [5.98] 
Note: This table reports the estimates of Equation (5) using OLS. All columns use a dependent variable of Rpt which is the 
return on portfolio p on day t (t = t, 2, …, T). T is the total number of daily return observations from January 1, 1994 
through December 31, 2015 (in this case T = 5,540). PreWithoutForceGUIDE and PostWithoutForceGUIDE  
(PreWithForceGUIDE and PostWithForceGUIDE) are indicator variables set equal to 1 during the three-day period (t = –1, 
0, +1) around the regulatory event dates where Proposed (Temporary and Final)  Regulations occur. The Pre (Post) prefix 
designates the regulatory events occurred before (after) FIN48. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance levels of 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. All 
continuous independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Variables 
are defined in Figure 2. 
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Table 8 
Market Response to Treasury Guidance – Weighted by UTB×R&D 
  
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑝𝑡 = 𝑊𝑝
′𝑅𝑖𝑡                    𝑊 = (𝑋
′𝑋)−1𝑋′ (6) 










    
Portfolio Weight UTB×R&D UTB×R&D UTB×R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PostGUIDE 0.001   
 (1.00)   
PostAnticipatedGUIDE  -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.20) (-0.20) 
PostActualGUIDE  0.005***  
  (2.58)  
PostWithoutForceGUIDE   0.005*** 







(Rmt – Rft) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.43) 
SMB -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.36) 
HML -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-4.96) (-4.98) (-4.97) 
RMW -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-3.64) (-3.67) (-3.66) 
CMA -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-2.57) (-2.56) (-2.55) 
Constant -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.52) 
R-squared 0.034 0.035 0.035 
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 
Note: This table reports the estimates of Equation (6) using OLS. All columns use a 
dependent variable of Rpt which is the return on portfolio p on day t (t = t, 2, …, T). T is 
the total number of daily return observations from January 1, 2008 through December 
31, 2015 (in this case T = 2,015). GUIDE is an indicator variable equal to 1 during the 
three-day period (t = –1, 0, +1) around the regulatory event date. *, **, *** denotes 
statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). 
Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. All 
continuous independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to 
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